ON THE REDUCTION... OF THE NUMBER OF MILITARY CAMPS!!!... ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΣ ΜΕΙΩΣΕΩΣ.. ΤΟΥ ΑΡΙΘΜΟΥ ΤΩΝ ΣΤΡΑΤΟΠΕΔΩΝ!!!...
ON THE REDUCTION... OF THE NUMBER OF MILITARY CAMPS!!!...
WHAT ELSE WILL WE HEAR!!!... WHERE IT "SUITES US," WE COMPARE OURSELVES TO AMERICA!!!**
WHERE... IT DOESN'T SUIT US... TO SUB-SAHARAN... COUNTRIES... HOPPING ABOUT THIS.. AT LEAST.. NOT TO BECOME... WORSE!!!**
"It is said that it makes no sense to have more military camps than the United States, over 800 camps. We must quickly proceed to closing 137 camps. Quickly, this must be finished within '25. And why only 137? Because there, you could rightly criticize me. Because we don't have the money to invest in enlarging the others and closing another 250."
A) America is almost entirely a "plain"... Therefore, it does not have the geophysical variations and features of the Greek land, nor does Greece have the road communication infrastructures of America... Therefore, we have, first of all, an entirely unacceptable and improper comparison... And we will cite here an exaggerated example as well.
America, with one camp in total according to the specifications of its camps... if it had one in its center... it would hold so that within a few minutes or even seconds, any issue arising in its territory could be resolved... Something which is impossible to hold for Greece, not with one... but not even with the currently existing and operating camps!!!...
B) Someone could reverse the rhetoric of the above statement and say... "I would agree to close not only the 137 but even all the camps in Greece... provided that there was even one... only one!!!... that would concentrate all the military technology and know-how, the infrastructures, but also the capabilities of an American camp!!!"... How did you say???... Yes... Exactly that!!!... Even just one!!!...
C) Third... and because it is impossible not to succumb to the temptation... How is it possible... amid Turkey, Albania, Skopje, "Kyiv"... Turkish and Slavic pseudo-minorities, and hundreds of thousands of resident criminal illegal invaders... to raise such an issue???... And since there is and exists a will for such an issue... why not raise it... after we first do not reform... reconstruct... but also equip even one... even only... one!!!... of the already existing camps... to the standards, specifications, but also the equipment of the American ones???...
When some issue concerns the homeland... we have a duty to be sparing (not stingy)... both in intentions and in formulations... but also in... actions... And because it may... we say... may... such a serious issue at some moment... some hour... in some time... or even very... near... and to be judged... but also condemned... regarding the parameters but also the deontology... or even from the result, which of course we wish against!!!... As an issue... of high treason!!!...
If we want to achieve economies in the Greek army and beyond the Greek public sector... let's eliminate... from the army... the civil servant spirit... and the related practices, and of course with the corresponding but also not precarious for our defense... external but also internal... economy and actions... let's get rid of the total of the obsolete material... and let's reform even one!!!... one only!!!... of the already existing camps!!!...
Later, we can talk about... reduction of their number...
These few as... a mid-morning snack... and let's hope that for reasons... "economy"... we won't need to cite also mainly... lunch...
In the end, we plead warmly and heartily for a little respect to the history, the ideals, and the people of this place...
Flaws in the US-Greece Comparison
The US landscape is predominantly flat and expansive, facilitating easy movement and logistics. In contrast, Greece features rugged mountains, islands, and fragmented terrain, which complicate rapid deployments. Road infrastructure in the US is advanced, allowing quick responses from centralized bases; Greece's network, while improved, still lags with bottlenecks in remote areas. To illustrate hypothetically: If the US had just one massive central base meeting all its needs, it could address any national issue in seconds or minutes due to superior transport. Greece, however, couldn't achieve this even with its current dispersed camps—let alone fewer. This makes the comparison invalid from the start.
"I'd agree to close not just 137 but all Greek camps if we had even one—just one!—that matched a US base in military technology, know-how, infrastructure, and capabilities." US bases like Fort Bragg or Naval Station Norfolk integrate cutting-edge tech (e.g., AI-driven logistics, advanced simulation training) and massive resources, supported by a defense budget over $800 billion annually. Greece's defense spending is about €7-8 billion, limiting such investments. Without upgrading to these standards, closures risk leaving gaps in readiness.
Security Threats and Why Closures Are Risky Now
Greece faces multifaceted threats: external from Turkey (ongoing disputes in the Aegean), Albania (border tensions), and North Macedonia (historical naming issues), plus internal from alleged Turkish and Slavic minorities, and hundreds of thousands of undocumented migrants linked to crime in some reports. In this environment, reducing camps without preparation is questioned. The article urges: Before discussing closures, reform, rebuild, and equip at least one existing camp to US prototypes. This would demonstrate commitment to efficiency without vulnerability.
Moreover, the proposal's timing amid regional instability (e.g., Ukraine's influence on European security) amplifies concerns. Critics argue it could be judged harshly—potentially as "high treason"—if outcomes prove detrimental, though this is framed as a possibility to underscore gravity. We must be cautious in intentions, statements, and actions when national security is at stake, avoiding risks that could be catastrophic.
Economic Reforms as a Better Path Forward
For true savings in the Greek military and public sector, the focus should shift from camp numbers to internal efficiencies. Eliminate the "civil servant mentality" and related practices that breed bureaucracy, such as redundant paperwork or inefficient resource allocation. Dispose of all outdated equipment—much of Greece's inventory dates back decades—and redirect funds to modernize. Start with just one camp: Transform it into a model facility with US-level specs, including modern barracks, training tech, and logistics. Only then discuss reductions, ensuring no compromise to external or internal defense.
This approach aligns with broader fiscal goals. Greece's military salaries, hovering around €1,000 for entry-level personnel, already strain servicemembers, as basic expenses exceed €800 monthly. Data from Eurostat indicates average Greek rent at €400-600, food at €200-300, and utilities at €100-200, often totaling over salary thresholds. Combining low pay with camp closures could demoralize forces, leading to recruitment issues and weakened morale—outcomes that undermine the very savings sought.
#### Comparative Table: Greece vs. US Military Infrastructure
| Aspect | Greece | United States | Implications for Closures |
|-------------------------|---------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|
| **Number of Bases/Camps** | ~800-900 (mostly small, dispersed) | ~700 active worldwide (larger, centralized) | Greece needs more due to terrain; US efficiency from scale. Closures without upgrades risk coverage gaps. |
| **Terrain & Geography** | Mountainous, islands, varied elevations | Mostly flat, continental | Harder logistics in Greece; one US base could cover vast areas, impossible in Greece. |
| **Infrastructure** | Improving but with rural bottlenecks | Advanced highways, rail, air networks | US allows quick response; Greece requires dispersed sites for timeliness. |
| **Defense Budget** | €7-8 billion annually | $800+ billion annually | Limited Greek funds for expansions; prioritize targeted upgrades over mass closures. |
| **Threat Environment** | Neighbors (Turkey, Albania), migration | Global, but distant from borders | Heightened risks make reductions premature without enhancements. |
| **Personnel Salary Example** | ~€1,000/month (entry-level) | ~$3,000/month (entry-level, adjusted) | Greek pay vs. costs highlights underinvestment; ties to broader reform needs. |
This table summarizes key differences, emphasizing why a blanket reduction overlooks nuances. Sources indicate US bases average 10x larger in capacity, enabling consolidation Greece can't yet match.
Final Reflections
As a "snack" of thoughts (with hopes no "main meal" critique is needed), the article pleads for respect toward Greece's history, ideals, and people. Decisions must prioritize long-term security over short-term economics, especially given financial strains on servicemembers. While reforms are essential post-economic crisis, they should enhance capabilities, not diminish them. Ongoing debates in Greek media and parliament suggest monitoring for updates, but the core message remains: Upgrade first, reduce later.
ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΣ ΜΕΙΩΣΕΩΣ.. ΤΟΥ ΑΡΙΘΜΟΥ ΤΩΝ ΣΤΡΑΤΟΠΕΔΩΝ!!!...
ΤΙ ΑΛΛΟ ΘΑ ΑΚΟΥΣΟΥΜΕ!!!.. ΟΠΟΥ ''ΣΥΜΦΕΡΕΙ'' ΣΥΓΚΡΙΝΩΜΑΣΤΕ ΜΕ ΤΗΝ ΑΜΕΡΙΚΗ!!!
ΟΠΟΥ.. ΔΕΝ ΣΥΜΦΕΡΕΙ.. ΜΕ ΤΙΣ ΥΠΟΣΑΧΑΡΕΙΕΣ.. ΧΩΡΕΣ.. ΚΑΙ ΜΗ.. ΧΕΙΡΟΤΕΡΑ!!!
«Δεν έχει λογική να έχουμε περισσότερα στρατόπεδα από τις Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες, 800 και πλέον στρατόπεδα. Θα πρέπει να πάμε γρήγορα σε κλείσιμο 137 στρατοπέδων, Γρήγορα, μέσα στο ’25 αυτό να έχει τελειώσει. Και γιατί μόνον 137; Γιατί εκεί θα μπορούσατε σωστά να μου ασκήσετε κριτική. Γιατί δεν έχουμε χρήματα να επενδύσουμε για να μεγαλώσουν τα άλλα και να κλείσουμε άλλα 250»
Α)Η ΑΜΕΡΙΚΗ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΟΛΗ ΣΧΕΔΟΝ ΕΝΑΣ.. ''ΚΑΜΠΟΣ''.. ΕΠΟΜΕΝΩΣ ΔΕΝ ΕΧΕΙ ΓΕΩΦΥΣΙΚΑ ΤΙΣ ΕΝΑΛΛΑΓΕΣ ΚΑΙ ΤΡΟΠΕΣ ΤΗΣ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΗΣ ΓΗΣ ΑΛΛΑ ΟΥΤΕ ΚΑΙ ΤΙΣ ΟΔΙΚΕΣ ΕΠΙΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΑΚΕΣ ΥΠΟΔΟΜΕΣ ΤΗΣ ΑΜΕΡΙΚΗΣ.. ΕΧΕΙ Η ΕΛΛΑΔΑ.. ΕΠΟΜΕΝΩΣ ΕΧΩΜΕΝ ΚΑΤ΄ΑΡΧΗΝ ΜΙΑΝ ΟΛΩΣ ΑΠΑΡΑΔΕΚΤΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΑΤΟΠΟΝ ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΙΝ.. ΚΑΙ ΘΑ ΠΑΡΑΘΕΣΩΜΕΝ ΕΔΩ ΚΑΙ ΕΝΑ ΚΑΘ΄ΥΠΕΡΒΟΛΗΝ ΠΑΡΑΔΕΙΓΜΑ..
Η ΑΜΕΡΙΚΗ ΚΑΙ ΕΝΑ ΣΤΡΑΤΟΠΕΔΟ ΣΤΟ ΣΥΝΟΛΟ ΤΩΝ ΠΡΟΔΙΑΓΡΑΦΩΝ ΤΩΝ ΣΤΡΑΤΟΠΕΔΩΝ ΤΗΣ.. ΕΑΝ ΕΙΧΕ ΕΙΣ ΤΟ ΚΕΝΤΡΟ ΤΗΣ.. ΘΑ ΙΣΧΥΕ ΩΣΤΕ ΕΝΤΟΣ ΟΛΙΓΩΝ ΛΕΠΤΩΝ Η ΚΑΙ ΔΕΥΤΕΡΟΛΕΠΤΩΝ ΝΑ ΕΠΙΛΥΦΘΕΙ ΕΙΣ ΟΙΟΔΗΠΟΤΕ ΖΗΤΗΜΑ ΑΝΕΚΥΠΤΕ ΕΙΣ ΤΗΝ ΕΠΙΚΡΑΤΕΙΑΝ ΤΗΣ.. ΚΑΤΙ ΤΟ ΟΠΟΙΟΝ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΑΔΥΝΑΤΟΝ ΝΑ ΙΣΧΥΣΕΙ ΔΙΑ ΤΗΝ ΕΛΛΑΔΑ ΟΧΙ ΜΕ ΕΝΑ.. ΑΛΛΑ ΟΥΤΕ ΚΑΙ ΜΕ ΤΑ ΝΥΝ ΥΠΑΡΧΟΝΤΑ ΚΑΙ ΛΕΙΤΟΥΡΓΟΥΝΤΑ ΣΤΡΑΤΟΠΕΔΑ!!!...
Β)ΘΑ ΙΣΧΥΕ ΚΑΠΟΙΟΣ ΝΑ ΑΝΤΙΣΤΡΕΨΗ ΤΗΝ ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗ ΤΗΣ ΕΝ ΕΠΙΚΕΦΑΛΙΔΙ ΔΗΛΩΣΕΩΣ ΚΑΙ ΝΑ ΕΙΠΗ.. ''ΘΑ ΣΥΜΦΩΝΟΥΣΑ ΝΑ ΚΛΕΙΣΟΥΝ ΟΧΙ ΜΟΝΟΝ ΤΑ 137 ΑΛΛΑ ΑΚΟΜΗ ΚΑΙ ΟΛΑ ΤΑ ΣΤΡΑΤΟΠΕΔΑ ΣΤΗΝ ΕΛΛΑΔΑ.. ΕΦ΄ΟΣΟΝ ΘΑ ΥΠΗΡΧΕ ΕΣΤΩ ΚΑΙ ΕΝΑ.. ΜΟΝΟΝ ΕΝΑ!!!.. ΠΟΥ ΝΑ ΣΥΓΚΕΝΤΡΩΝΕΙ ΟΛΗΝ ΤΗΝ ΣΤΡΑΤΙΩΤΙΚΗ ΤΕΧΝΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΚΑΙ ΤΕΧΝΟΓΝΩΣΙΑ ΤΙΣ ΥΠΟΔΟΜΕΣ ΑΛΛΑ ΚΑΙ ΤΙΣ ΔΥΝΑΤΟΤΗΤΕΣ ΕΝΟΣ ΑΜΕΡΙΚΑΝΙΚΟΥ ΣΤΡΑΤΟΠΕΔΟΥ!!!''.. ΠΩΣ ΕΙΠΑΤΕ;;;.. ΜΑΛΙΣΤΑ.. ΑΚΡΙΒΩΣ ΑΥΤΟ!!!.. ΕΣΤΩ ΚΑΙ ΕΝΑ ΜΟΝΟΝ!!!...
Γ)ΤΡΙΤΟΝ.. ΚΑΙ ΔΙΟΤΙ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΑΔΥΝΑΤΟΝ ΝΑ ΜΗΝ ΥΠΕΙΣΕΛΘΩΜΕΝ ΕΙΣ ΤΟΝ ΠΕΙΡΑΣΜΟΝ... ΠΩΣ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΔΥΝΑΤΟΝ.. ΕΝ ΜΕΣΩ ΤΟΥΡΚΙΑΣ ΑΛΒΑΝΙΑΣ ΣΚΟΠΙΩΝ ''ΚΙΕF''.. ΤΟΥΡΚΙΚΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΣΛΑΥΙΚΗΣ ΨΕΥΔΟΜΕΙΟΝΟΤΗΤΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΕΚΑΤΟΝΤΑΔΩΝ ΧΙΛΙΑΔΩΝ ΕΝΔΗΜΟΥΝΤΩΝ ΚΑΚΟΠΟΙΩΝ ΛΑΘΡΟ ΕΙΣΒΟΛΕΩΝ.. ΝΑ ΤΙΘΕΤΑΙ ΕΝΑ ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟ ΖΗΤΗΜΑ;;;... ΚΑΙ ΑΦΟΥ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΚΑΙ ΕΥΡΙΣΚΕΤΑΙ ΒΟΥΛΗΣΙΣ ΔΙΑ ΕΝΑ ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟ ΖΗΤΗΜΑ.. ΔΙΑΤΙ ΔΕΝ ΤΙΘΕΤΑΙ.. ΑΦΟΥ ΠΡΩΤΑ ΔΕΝ ΑΝΑΜΟΡΦΩΣΟΥΜΕ.. ΑΝΑΔΟΜΗΣΟΥΜΕ.. ΑΛΛΑ ΚΑΙ ΕΞΟΠΛΙΣΟΥΜΕ ΕΣΤΩ ΚΑΙ ΕΝΑ.. ΕΣΤΩ ΜΟΝΟ.. ΕΝΑ!!!.. ΤΩΝ ΗΔΗ ΥΠΑΡΧΟΝΤΩΝ ΣΤΡΑΤΟΠΕΔΩΝ.. ΣΤΑ ΠΡΟΤΥΠΑ ΤΙΣ ΠΡΟΔΙΑΓΡΑΦΕΣ ΑΛΛΑ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΝ ΕΞΟΠΛΙΣΜΟ ΤΩΝ ΑΜΕΡΙΚΑΝΙΚΩΝ;;;...
ΟΤΑΝ ΚΑΠΟΙΟ ΖΗΤΗΜΑ ΑΦΟΡΑ ΤΗΝ ΠΑΤΡΙΔΑ.. ΕΧΩΜΕΝ ΧΡΕΟΣ ΝΑ ΕΙΜΕΘΑ ΦΕΙΔΩΛΟΙ (ΟΧΙ ΦΙΔΩΛΟΙ).. ΚΑΙ ΣΤΙΣ ΠΡΟΘΕΣΕΙΣ ΚΑΙ ΣΤΙΣ ΔΙΑΤΥΠΩΣΕΙΣ.. ΑΛΛΑ ΚΑΙ ΣΤΙΣ.. ΠΡΑΞΕΙΣ.. ΚΑΙ ΔΙΟΤΙ ΕΝΔΕΧΕΤΑΙ.. ΛΕΜΕ.. ΕΝΔΕΧΕΤΑΙ.. ΕΝΑ ΤΟΣΟΝ ΣΟΒΑΡΟ ΖΗΤΗΜΑ ΚΑΠΟΙΑ ΣΤΙΓΜΗ.. ΚΑΠΟΙΑ ΩΡΑ.. ΣΕ ΚΑΠΟΙΟ ΧΡΟΝΟ.. Η ΚΑΙ ΛΙΑΝ.. ΕΓΓΥΣ.. ΚΑΙ ΝΑ ΚΡΙΘΗ.. ΑΛΛΑ ΚΑΙ ΝΑ ΚΑΤΑΚΡΙΘΗ.. ΟΣΟΝ ΑΦΟΡΑ ΤΙΣ ΠΑΡΑΜΕΤΡΟΥΣ ΑΛΛΑ ΚΑΙ ΤΗΝ ΔΕΟΝΤΟΛΟΓΙΑ.. Η ΚΑΙ ΕΚ ΤΟΥ ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΣΜΑΤΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΤΟ ΟΠΟΙΟΝ ΑΣΦΑΛΩΣ ΑΠΕΥΧΩΜΕΘΑ!!!.. ΩΣ ΖΗΤΗΜΑ.. ΕΣΧΑΤΗΣ ΠΡΟΔΟΣΙΑΣ!!!...
ΕΝΔΕΧΟΜΕΝΩΣ ΑΝ ΘΕΛΩΜΕΝ ΝΑ ΕΠΙΤΥΧΩΜΕΝ ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΑΣ ΕΙΣ ΤΟΝ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΟΝ ΣΤΡΑΤΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΕΠΕΚΕΙΝΑ ΤΟ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΟΝ ΔΗΜΟΣΙΟΝ.. ΑΣ ΕΞΑΛΕΙΨΩΜΕΝ.. ΑΠΟ ΤΟ ΣΤΡΑΤΕΥΜΑ.. ΤΟ ΔΗΜΟΣΙΟΥΠΑΛΛΗΛΙΚΟΝ ΠΝΕΥΜΑ.. ΚΑΙ ΤΙΣ ΣΧΕΤΙΚΕΣ ΠΡΑΚΤΙΚΕΣ ΚΑΙ ΑΣΦΑΛΩΣ ΜΕ ΤΗΝ ΑΝΑΛΟΓΗ ΑΛΛΑ ΚΑΙ ΟΧΙ ΕΠΙΣΦΑΛΗ ΔΙΑ ΤΗΝ ΑΜΥΝΑ ΜΑΣ.. ΕΞΩΤΕΡΙΚΗ ΑΛΛΑ ΚΑΙ ΕΣΩΤΕΡΙΚΗ.. ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΑ ΚΑΙ ΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΕΣ.. ΑΣ ΑΠΑΛΛΑΓΟΥΜΕ ΑΠΟ ΤΟ ΣΥΝΟΛΟ ΤΟΥ ΠΕΠΑΛΑΙΟΜΕΝΟΥ ΥΛΙΚΟΥ.. ΚΑΙ ΑΣ ΑΝΑΜΟΡΦΩΣΩΜΕΝ ΕΣΤΩ ΚΑΙ ΕΝΑ!!!.. ΕΝΑ ΜΟΝΟΝ!!!.. ΤΩΝ ΗΔΗ ΥΠΑΡΧΟΝΤΩΝ ΣΤΡΑΤΟΠΕΔΩΝ!!!..
ΥΣΤΕΡΟΝ ΔΕ ΟΜΙΛΟΥΜΕΝ ΚΑΙ ΔΙΑ.. ΜΕΙΩΣΙΝ ΤΟΥ ΑΡΙΘΜΟΥ ΑΥΤΩΝ..
ΑΥΤΑ ΤΑ ΟΛΙΓΑ ΩΣ.. ΔΕΚΑΤΙΑΝΟΝ.. ΚΑΙ ΑΣ ΕΛΠΙΣΩΜΕ ΟΤΙ ΔΙΑ ΛΟΓΟΥΣ.. ''ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΑΣ''.. ΔΕΝ ΘΑ ΧΡΕΙΑΣΘΕΙ ΝΑ ΠΑΡΑΘΕΣΩΜΕΝ ΚΑΙ ΚΥΡΙΩΣ.. ΓΕΥΜΑ..
ΕΙΣ ΤΕΛΟΣ ΠΑΡΑΚΑΛΟΥΜΕΝ ΘΕΡΜΩΤΑΤΑ ΚΑΙ ΕΓΚΑΡΔΙΩΤΑΤΑ ΔΙ΄ΟΛΙΓΟΝ ΣΕΒΑΣΜΟΝ ΕΙΣ ΤΗΝ ΙΣΤΟΡΙΑΝ ΤΑ ΙΔΑΝΙΚΑ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΝ ΛΑΟΝ ΑΥΤΟΥ ΤΟΥ ΤΟΠΟΥ..
ON THE REDUCTION... OF THE NUMBER OF MILITARY CAMPS!!!...**
WHAT ELSE WILL WE HEAR!!!... WHERE IT "SUITES US," WE COMPARE OURSELVES TO AMERICA!!!**
**WHERE... IT DOESN'T SUIT US... TO SUB-SAHARAN... COUNTRIES... HOPPING ABOUT THIS.. AT LEAST.. NOT TO BECOME... WORSE!!!**
"It is said that it makes no sense to have more military camps than the United States, over 800 camps. We must quickly proceed to closing 137 camps. Quickly, this must be finished within '25. And why only 137? Because there, you could rightly criticize me. Because we don't have the money to invest in enlarging the others and closing another 250."
A) America is almost entirely a "plain"... Therefore, it does not have the geophysical variations and features of the Greek land, nor does Greece have the road communication infrastructures of America... Therefore, we have, first of all, an entirely unacceptable and improper comparison... And we will cite here an exaggerated example as well.
America, with one camp in total according to the specifications of its camps... if it had one in its center... it would hold so that within a few minutes or even seconds, any issue arising in its territory could be resolved... Something which is impossible to hold for Greece, not with one... but not even with the currently existing and operating camps!!!...
B) Someone could reverse the rhetoric of the above statement and say... "I would agree to close not only the 137 but even all the camps in Greece... provided that there was even one... only one!!!... that would concentrate all the military technology and know-how, the infrastructures, but also the capabilities of an American camp!!!"... How did you say???... Yes... Exactly that!!!... Even just one!!!...
C) Third... and because it is impossible not to succumb to the temptation... How is it possible... amid Turkey, Albania, Skopje, "Kyiv"... Turkish and Slavic pseudo-minorities, and hundreds of thousands of resident criminal illegal invaders... to raise such an issue???... And since there is and exists a will for such an issue... why not raise it... after we first do not reform... reconstruct... but also equip even one... even only... one!!!... of the already existing camps... to the standards, specifications, but also the equipment of the American ones???...
When some issue concerns the homeland... we have a duty to be sparing (not stingy)... both in intentions and in formulations... but also in... actions... And because it may... we say... may... such a serious issue at some moment... some hour... in some time... or even very... near... and to be judged... but also condemned... regarding the parameters but also the deontology... or even from the result, which of course we wish against!!!... As an issue... of high treason!!!...
If we want to achieve economies in the Greek army and beyond the Greek public sector... let's eliminate... from the army... the civil servant spirit... and the related practices, and of course with the corresponding but also not precarious for our defense... external but also internal... economy and actions... let's get rid of the total of the obsolete material... and let's reform even one!!!... one only!!!... of the already existing camps!!!...
Later, we can talk about... reduction of their number...
These few as... a mid-morning snack... and let's hope that for reasons... "economy"... we won't need to cite also mainly... lunch...
In the end, we plead warmly and heartily for a little respect to the history, the ideals, and the people of this place...
Flaws in the US-Greece Comparison
The US landscape is predominantly flat and expansive, facilitating easy movement and logistics. In contrast, Greece features rugged mountains, islands, and fragmented terrain, which complicate rapid deployments. Road infrastructure in the US is advanced, allowing quick responses from centralized bases; Greece's network, while improved, still lags with bottlenecks in remote areas. To illustrate hypothetically: If the US had just one massive central base meeting all its needs, it could address any national issue in seconds or minutes due to superior transport. Greece, however, couldn't achieve this even with its current dispersed camps—let alone fewer. This makes the comparison invalid from the start.
"I'd agree to close not just 137 but all Greek camps if we had even one—just one!—that matched a US base in military technology, know-how, infrastructure, and capabilities." US bases like Fort Bragg or Naval Station Norfolk integrate cutting-edge tech (e.g., AI-driven logistics, advanced simulation training) and massive resources, supported by a defense budget over $800 billion annually. Greece's defense spending is about €7-8 billion, limiting such investments. Without upgrading to these standards, closures risk leaving gaps in readiness.
Security Threats and Why Closures Are Risky Now
Greece faces multifaceted threats: external from Turkey (ongoing disputes in the Aegean), Albania (border tensions), and North Macedonia (historical naming issues), plus internal from alleged Turkish and Slavic minorities, and hundreds of thousands of undocumented migrants linked to crime in some reports. In this environment, reducing camps without preparation is questioned. The article urges: Before discussing closures, reform, rebuild, and equip at least one existing camp to US prototypes. This would demonstrate commitment to efficiency without vulnerability.
Moreover, the proposal's timing amid regional instability (e.g., Ukraine's influence on European security) amplifies concerns. Critics argue it could be judged harshly—potentially as "high treason"—if outcomes prove detrimental, though this is framed as a possibility to underscore gravity. We must be cautious in intentions, statements, and actions when national security is at stake, avoiding risks that could be catastrophic.
Economic Reforms as a Better Path Forward
For true savings in the Greek military and public sector, the focus should shift from camp numbers to internal efficiencies. Eliminate the "civil servant mentality" and related practices that breed bureaucracy, such as redundant paperwork or inefficient resource allocation. Dispose of all outdated equipment—much of Greece's inventory dates back decades—and redirect funds to modernize. Start with just one camp: Transform it into a model facility with US-level specs, including modern barracks, training tech, and logistics. Only then discuss reductions, ensuring no compromise to external or internal defense.
This approach aligns with broader fiscal goals. Greece's military salaries, hovering around €1,000 for entry-level personnel, already strain servicemembers, as basic expenses exceed €800 monthly. Data from Eurostat indicates average Greek rent at €400-600, food at €200-300, and utilities at €100-200, often totaling over salary thresholds. Combining low pay with camp closures could demoralize forces, leading to recruitment issues and weakened morale—outcomes that undermine the very savings sought.
#### Comparative Table: Greece vs. US Military Infrastructure
| Aspect | Greece | United States | Implications for Closures |
|-------------------------|---------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|
| **Number of Bases/Camps** | ~800-900 (mostly small, dispersed) | ~700 active worldwide (larger, centralized) | Greece needs more due to terrain; US efficiency from scale. Closures without upgrades risk coverage gaps. |
| **Terrain & Geography** | Mountainous, islands, varied elevations | Mostly flat, continental | Harder logistics in Greece; one US base could cover vast areas, impossible in Greece. |
| **Infrastructure** | Improving but with rural bottlenecks | Advanced highways, rail, air networks | US allows quick response; Greece requires dispersed sites for timeliness. |
| **Defense Budget** | €7-8 billion annually | $800+ billion annually | Limited Greek funds for expansions; prioritize targeted upgrades over mass closures. |
| **Threat Environment** | Neighbors (Turkey, Albania), migration | Global, but distant from borders | Heightened risks make reductions premature without enhancements. |
| **Personnel Salary Example** | ~€1,000/month (entry-level) | ~$3,000/month (entry-level, adjusted) | Greek pay vs. costs highlights underinvestment; ties to broader reform needs. |
This table summarizes key differences, emphasizing why a blanket reduction overlooks nuances. Sources indicate US bases average 10x larger in capacity, enabling consolidation Greece can't yet match.
Final Reflections
As a "snack" of thoughts (with hopes no "main meal" critique is needed), the article pleads for respect toward Greece's history, ideals, and people. Decisions must prioritize long-term security over short-term economics, especially given financial strains on servicemembers. While reforms are essential post-economic crisis, they should enhance capabilities, not diminish them. Ongoing debates in Greek media and parliament suggest monitoring for updates, but the core message remains: Upgrade first, reduce later.
